About this information
Search the summaries of completed Access to Information (ATI) requests to find information about ATI requests made to the Government of Canada after January 2020. If you find a summary of interest, you can request a copy of the records at no cost using the form below each summary. Requests made through this form are considered informal requests and are not subject to the same requirements as requests under the Access to Information Act (ATIA).
If you don’t find what you are looking for you can request additional government records under an institution’s control by contacting the institution’s Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator or by submitting a formal access to information request.
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Found 488 record(s)
Req # A-2020-014
Please provide records that outline the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s methodology for assessing potential projects from June 1, 2017 to October 24, 2019.Organization: Canada Infrastructure Bank
58 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-00038
REQUEST. Provide access to any and all Station Blackout Reports (SBOs) in 2003 and emerging IRS Reports generated by the CNSC pertaining to the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station “A” (units I to 4) and the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station “B” (units 5 to 8). 2003 STATION BLACKOUT (SBO) AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. BACKGROUND. A station blackout is defined as a plant condition with complete loss of all AC power from the preferred offsite AC sources, from the main generator and from standby AC power sources important to safety to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses. DC power supplies and uninterruptible AC 34 power supplies may be available as long as batteries can supply the loads. Alternate AC power supplies are available. SBOs have traditionally been underreported but according to the IAEA, these are occurring at frequencies above that what traditionally would be considered as normal. There are several safety aspects associated with SBO events which may lead to the deterioration of key safety functions. An SBO event can lead to a severe accident if there are complications in the restoration of electrical power to plant buses within the coping time. The loss of grid is generally an initiating event and coincidental failure of onsite AC power supplies results in an SBO.Organization: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
312 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-00061
This request is for documentation related to transportation packages for used nuclear reactor fuel (also referred to as spent fuel or irradiated fuel or high level radioactive wastes) including those referred to as “Used Fuel Transportation Packages" and owned or proposed by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO). The request is for documentation of, and related to, safety or technical reviews and/or the certification process for used fuel transportation packages, and communications related to these reviews undertaken by the CNSC between the CNSC and the NWMO and between the CNSC and other regulatory bodies, such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC). The documentation requested is with respect to two certification processes: 1. The technical review and any other review(s) undertaken by the CNSC in relation to the certification by the CNSC of a transport package design. CDN/2052/B(U)-96 (Rev. 7), including but not limited to CNSC File 30-H1-118-0 dated July 29, 2013. 2. The technical review and any other review(s) undertaken by the CNSC in relation to the re-certification by the CNSC of a transport package design. CDN/2052/B(U)-96 as undertaken and/or having related to recertification of the transport package design in 2018.Organization: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
125 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-00062
The request is for documentation of, and related to, safety or technical reviews and/or the certification process for transportation packages for used nuclear reactor fuel, cores or components (also referred to as spent fuel or irradiated fuel or high-level radioactive wastes) including pieces and fragments, and includes communications related to these reviews undertaken by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) between the CNSC and the NWMO and/or their agents, between the CNSC and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) and/or their agents, and between the CNSC and other regulatory bodies, such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC). The documentation requested is with respect to two certification processes: 1. The technical review and any other review(s) undertaken by the CNSC in relation to the certification of the transportation package used to transport the reactor core from the SLOWPOKE-2 Reactor from Saskatoon, Saskatchewan to Savannah River, South Carolina in 2019. 2. The technical review and any other review(s) being undertaken or that has been undertaken by the CNSC in relation to the used fuel transportation package (UFTP) for the transport of spent fuel or irradiated fuel or high-level radioactive wastes or pieces or fragments thereof between the Whiteshell Nuclear Laboratory in Pinawa, Manitoba and the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory in Chalk River, Ontario.Organization: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
620 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-00083
Provide the minutes of the Regulatory Framework Steering Committee for 2019.Organization: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
32 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-00088
Please provide all CNSC internal correspondence and also CNSC correspondence with AECL, CNL, IAEA, Vienna Permanent Mission and any Canadian or foreign government department or private company (emails, reports, phone transcripts, presentations) containing information since January 2016, regarding: 1. The International Independent Peer Review (IIPR) of the NSDF at Chalk River; and 2. The proposed IAEA ARTEMIS review mission for the NSDF at Chalk River. The following specific information is requested: A) The proposed scope of the ARTEMIS review of CNL’s NSDF safety case, envisaged by the last bullet of slide 27 of the CNSC presentation of May 17, 2018: Canadian Update to the International Nuclear Regulators Association, Gyeongju, Republic of Korea, e-Doc 5514465. B) Prior correspondence, relating to page 9 of the August 13, 2019, e-mail of ATIP-2019-00054AI reference to the 2017 CNSC initiative for an independent third party review of the NSDF by the IAEA. C) All correspondence prior to and subsequent to p. 11 of the email of November 2, 2017, ATIP-2019-00054AI, relating to the CNSC payment of and discussions with the IAEA for the ARTEMIS NSDF peer review, including information on the changes made leading to the withdrawal of the ARTEMIS review proposal. Information already provided in ATIP-2019-00054AI is not required. The CNSC presentation of May 17, 2018, e-Doc 5514465 is also not required. Follow up information from ATI A-2019-00054AI.Organization: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
4 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-000029
Documents regarding Canso spaceport project in Nova Scotia and Maritime Launch Services, from January 1, 2019, to September 9, 2019.Organization: Canadian Space Agency
27 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020
Req # A-2019-000038
Subject lines of emails sent or received by Sylvain Laporte, President, Canadian Space Agency, between October 20, 2019, and November 20, 2019.Organization: Canadian Space Agency
14 page(s)
January 2020
January 2020